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Abstract
Re-authenticating users may be necessary for smartphone authentication schemes that
leverage user behavior, device context, or task sensitivity. However, due to the unpre-
dictable nature of re-authentication, users may get annoyed when they have to use the
default, non-transparent authentication prompt for re-authentication. We address this
concern by proposing a few configurations with varying levels of screen transparency and
time delays when displaying the authentication prompt. We conduct user studies with 30
participants to evaluate the usability and security of these configurations. We also study
whether the user preferences of the configurations vary depending on the application the
participants are using on their device or their surrounding environment. We find that
the participants generally prefer the authentication configuration with a non-transparent
background for sensitive applications, such as banking and photo apps. Our findings also
indicate that the user preferences are inclined towards convenient, usable configurations
while participants are using their devices at home. Though we did not observe any signif-
icant differences in the task completion overhead and context switch overhead among our
proposed configurations, we find that participants utilize the time delay just before the
authentication prompt is going to appear to complete their current task. We also provide
implementation details of our Android lock library, FireLock, which developers can use to
re-authenticate users while they are using their app. We conclude with suggestions to im-
prove the design of the proposed configurations as well as a discussion of other mechanisms
to notify the users in case of re-authentication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The growing usage of smartphones for both personal and corporate data has increased the
need to authenticate users at multiple levels. Explicit Authentication (EA) mechanisms
such as a PIN/pattern lock, text-based passwords or fingerprint recognition require the
users to explicitly unlock their device by entering a pass-code in order to access the apps
and other content stored on their devices. While a device-level authentication scheme is
required to protect access to the device, an app-level authentication may provide further
protection from accessing social networking, banking or enterprise apps. However, exist-
ing studies have shown that the short and frequent nature of smartphone sessions creates
usability issues for device-level authentication schemes [HDA+13] whereas constrained key-
boards on smartphones are a bottleneck when users are authenticating using text-based
passwords [SDW12]. Also recent studies [EJP+14, HVZF+14] have found that more than
40% of the participants do not use any authentication mechanism on their devices because
they find it inconvenient to unlock their device every time they want to access the content
on their device.
To mitigate these usability issues, researchers have proposed several techniques that
reduce the authentication burden by leveraging user behavior [LZX13, SNJC10, XZL14],
device context [HDA+13, MJB+15, MHK+14] or the sensitivity of launched apps [HRS+12].
While these schemes reduce the authentication burden on the user, they may require mid-
task re-authentication. Schemes that leverage user behavior need re-authentication in case
of a behavior mismatch against the current phone user. Similarly, device context-based
schemes may need to establish a user’s identity in case a contextual source (e.g., ambient
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noise) changes. Taking the sensitivity of launched apps into account for authentication
may also require mid-task re-authentication. For instance, some users have indicated that
for a messenger app, only opening old messages should trigger re-authentication [HRS+12].
1.2 Re-authentication Scenarios
In this section, we describe some of the authentication techniques discussed above and
their potential need to re-authenticate users.
• Implicit authentication (IA): Mobile devices typically have many built-in sen-
sors which are capable of collecting rich sets of information such as the current
location of the user, their touch input data or their gait pattern. IA uses the infor-
mation collected by these sensors to conveniently authenticate users without requir-
ing their explicit input. Various IA schemes have been proposed that authenticate
users through their touch input behavior [FBM+13, LZX13, XZL14], keystroke be-
havior [DZZ13, FZCS13, GMCB14], gait behavior [FMP10, MM13] or device usage
behavior [SNJC10, SYJ+11]. Several IA proposals have been shown to provide over
95% accuracy [FBM+13, LZX13, XZL14] and researchers have proposed to use them
as a primary authentication mechanism for users who do not lock their device or as
a secondary authentication mechanism to complement the existing primary authen-
tication schemes.
There are scenarios when an IA scheme is unsure about the identity of the user.
This uncertainty may be caused by an adversary using the device or it could be the
result of a false reject. False rejects occur when legitimate users are misclassified as
adversaries. When an IA scheme is unsure about the identity of the user, it uses an
explicit authentication mechanism to re-authenticate the user. Furthermore, if an IA
scheme relies on the input behavior of the user, the false rejects can occur mid-task
and re-authentication requires interrupting the current task of the user [KHV15].
• Context-aware authentication: Several schemes have been proposed that lever-
age device context to reduce authentication overhead [HDA+13, MJB+15, MHK+14,
RQSL12]. These schemes rely on a variety of contextual sources, including location,
proximity to WiFi and Bluetooth devices, and ambient light and noise. An evalu-
ation of CASA [HDA+13] shows that it can reduce explicit authentications by 68%
and a lab study of the scheme proposed by Riva et al. [RQSL12] indicates that it can
reduce the number of explicit authentications by 42%.
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Context-aware schemes can be deployed to sense and assist in authentication only
when users begin their interaction with the device. However, to preclude attacks
from informed attackers (such as friends and coworkers), a continuous authentication
scenario is more suitable. For instance, a continuous proximity sensing scheme will
not allow an informed malicious coworker to unlock the device at the workplace and
then move to a secluded place to access personal data on the device. Since such
scenarios may arise with the legitimate user of the device (e.g., the device owner
moves out of the proximity range while using the device, or an ambient noise sensor
may switch off), the device owner may be subjected to mid-task re-authentication.
• App-specific authentication: Hayashi et al. [HRS+12] show that all-or-nothing
access to smartphones does not align with user preferences. They find that while
the majority of the users prefer to be authenticated for selected apps only, for a
subset of apps the users want some functionality to be available always and some
functionality to be available after authentication. For instance, browsing existing
entries (such as contacts) in an app should always be available while modifying or
deleting entries should require authentication. Similarly, looking at recent messages
should not require authentication while browsing old messages should require user
authentication. These scenarios require mid-task re-authentication of the user.
1.3 Need for Better Re-authentication Schemes
Preliminary evaluations show that users like the convenience offered by the schemes dis-
cussed in the previous section [CR14, HDA+13, HRS+12, KHV15, MJB+15]; however, a
field study of behavior-based authentication shows that re-authentications are a potential
issue [KHV15]. More specifically, the evaluated scheme used a (simulated) behavior-based
authentication scheme that focused on the user’s touch input behavior. Whenever re-
authentication was required, the user’s current task was interrupted and a re-authentication
prompt with dark background, similar to the standard Android authentication prompt, ap-
peared immediately. Non-surprisingly the unpredictability of a re-authentication and the
context switch due to the task interruption were annoying to some users.
While re-authentication is unavoidable to preclude misuse of a device or an app, the
unpredictability of re-authentication can be reduced by delaying the transition between
the current task and the re-authentication prompt through a fade-in effect. During the
fade-in, the user is allowed to continue interacting with their current task on the device.
In addition to the fade-in effect, the re-authentication prompt can be configured to have
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varying levels of screen transparency to provide a visual of the user’s current task in the
background. The fade-in effect should reduce the unpredictability of the re-authentication
and a visual of the current task of the user should reduce the context switch overhead
due to re-authentications. Together these controls have the potential to provide increased
usability at the cost of reduced security.
Thesis Statement: Re-authentication may be necessary for certain scenarios and the
widely deployed authentication mechanisms can be modified to make them more usable
for re-authentication without significantly comprising on security.
1.4 Contributions
In the thesis, we evaluate different configurations of explicit authentication schemes (such
as PINs or pattern locks) when used for re-authentication. Our focus is on the time delay
and the transparency of the re-authentication prompt. We choose behavior-based authen-
tication as a target use case to evaluate the different configurations; however, our findings
can be generalized to other authentication proposals that result in re-authentications. In
addition to the re-authentication configuration employed in the previous work [KHV15],
which has a non-transparent background, we select three configurations of explicit authen-
tication schemes for re-authentication:
i) The authentication prompt appears immediately (no time delay) and the background
of the authentication prompt is transparent to provide a visual of the user’s current
task in the background;
ii) The authentication prompt appears immediately and the background of the authenti-
cation prompt gradually transitions from transparent to opaque for improved security;
and
iii) The authentication prompt appears after a four-second time delay and the background
of the authentication prompt gradually transitions from transparent to opaque.
We perform lab experiments using synthetic tasks to evaluate the security perception, ease
of use, obstructiveness and annoyance of PIN and pattern-lock-based re-authentication
based on the default configuration from the earlier study [KHV15] (as a baseline) and
the modified configurations. In addition to these qualitative usability metrics, we collect
quantitative data on the task efficiency and the task error rate for a multifaceted evaluation
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of these configurations. Finally, we conduct interviews to gather participants’ perceptions
on the sensitivity of different kinds of apps and of participants’ preferred configuration of
the re-authentication prompt for different apps and different environments.
Our study was completed by 30 participants. Though our findings indicate no differ-
ences for the user performance (in terms of task efficiency, task error rate, and context
switch overhead) against these configurations, participants found all three modified config-
urations to be less annoying and less obstructive as compared to the default configuration.
The modified configurations were also at least as easy to use as the default configuration.
As expected, the perceived security level of the modified configurations was quite low when
compared to the default configuration. While the low perceived level of protection was a
bottleneck in the adoption of the modified configurations in high-risk environments and for
sensitive content, a significant number of participants preferred the proposed configurations
over the default configuration for less sensitive content and for low-risk environments.
Based on the suggestions given by the participants, we develop FireLock, an open-
source Android lock library allowing the app developers to re-authenticate the users while
they are using their app. The lock library is compatible with most of the recent Android
smartphones and can be easily used by the developers by adding only three lines in their
code. We also provide a demo of our lock library for a behavior-based authentication
scheme and integrate it with an open-source messaging app.
In the next chapter, we present some of the related work in this area. In Chapter 3,
we describe in detail the proposed lock configurations. In Chapter 4, we describe our
user study setup and the participant sample. We report the findings of the study in
Chapter 5 followed by the details of the implementation of our lock library in Chapter 6.
We also communicate the suggestions by the participants on how to improve the design
of our proposed configurations and discuss guidelines for future implementations of re-
authentication schemes in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter, we present the related work in this area. In Section 2.1, we discuss the
existing work on understanding usability issues with existing authentication schemes and
present some of the alternate schemes that have been proposed to conveniently authenticate
users. Section 2.2 focuses on the existing work in the areas of authentication scenarios that
require re-authentication.
2.1 Authentication Schemes
Several authentication schemes have been proposed in the past ranging from alphanumeric
password schemes to graphical and gesture-based password schemes. Most of these au-
thentication schemes are susceptible to memorability issues, shoulder-surfing attacks and
smudge attacks. However, as we discuss later in this section, apart from these security
issues, usability issues with these schemes, such as ease of unlocking, the time taken to
unlock, influence the users’ preferences of these schemes. More recently biometric-based
schemes, which include fingerprint recognition, face recognition and behavior-based authen-
tication, have been introduced. Though biometric approaches provide advantages over the
traditional authentication methods, these authentication techniques have still not become
very popular due to a fear among the users of a potential risk to their biometric data and
high authentication times compared to other schemes [ZKM15].
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2.1.1 Usability Issues with Existing Authentication Schemes
Researchers have extensively investigated the usability issues with primary authentication
schemes [DLHVZH15, HVZF+14, TSK+12, VZDDL13, ZKM15] and have shown that these
issues prevent users from using these schemes [EJP+14, HVZF+14].
PIN/Pattern Lock
Harbach et al. [HVZF+14] recently performed a real world study on smartphone unlocking
and found that users spend a significant amount of the overall device usage time (2.9%
on average) on entering their PINs or unlock patterns. They also found that locking the
device is not necessary for all the apps installed on the device as sensitive data is rarely
accessed. They observed that the participants who did not lock their phone were satisfied
with their choice and indicated very few situations where they would rather have locked
their screens. They concluded that higher authentication frequency reduces the usability of
the authentication scheme and recommended that researchers should focus on decreasing
the number of unlocks by deploying context-dependent locking mechanisms. We take this
recommendation into consideration for our study.
A research study was conducted by Von Zezschwitz et al. [VZDDL13] which aimed at
understanding the performance of a PIN and a pattern lock on mobile devices. Though
quantitative results of the study indicated that the pattern lock is more prone to errors, it
was rated favorably in terms of ease-of-use and efficiency. Therefore, while designing the
lock configurations, we give a lot of importance to enhance the usability experience of the
users during re-authentication.
Biometric Authentication
De Luca et al. [DLHVZH15] conducted an on-line study using MTurk to understand the
reasons behind using and not using biometric authentication on smartphones. They focused
their study on the two most prevalent biometrics systems, Apple’s Touch ID and Android’s
Face Unlock, and found that the users preferred using Touch ID as they found it to be
faster and more convenient compared to Face Unlock. Many participants reported that
they stopped using Face Unlock because they found it to be slow in cases when they needed
quick access to their device. Touch ID on the other hand did not impose much overhead
and was therefore preferred by the users.
While usability is a major concern, users are worried about the security and privacy of
their biometric data as well. Zirjawi et al. [ZKM15] conducted an on-line survey with 139
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participants to understand the user requirements and preferences for biometric authenti-
cation. They reported in their study that users were concerned about how their biometric
data was used and where it was stored. Among the biometric data, fingerprint information
was the most critical information for most of the participants. The authors gave design
recommendations and suggested that building secure authentication could help in building
trust among the users towards the system.
2.1.2 Alternate Authentication Schemes
Another line of research has focused on addressing the usability issues with existing pri-
mary authentication schemes by proposing alternate mechanisms, including new PIN-
based [DLHH10, VZDLBH15] schemes, graphical passwords [KN14, SWKW13, WWB+05]
or gesture-based authentication [AK14, SLS13] schemes.
PIN-Based Password Schemes
New PIN based authentication schemes have been proposed to counter the shoulder surfing
attacks and improve the usability issues as mentioned in the previous section. In 2015, Von
Zezschwitz et al. [VZDLBH15] proposed SwiPIN, which uses touch gestures in combination
with PIN to protect against shoulder surfing attacks. This system is based on a random
assignment of simple touch gestures to specific digits. In order to enter a digit, users simply
perform the gesture associated with that digit at a location different than the respective
button (Figure 2.1a). They concluded that SwiPIN is easy to use, resistant against shoulder
surfing attacks and is very useful in sensitive environments such as in an office or around
strangers.
De Luca et al. [DLHH10] proposed ColorPIN by representing each digit with a color.
The keypad displays all the ten digits along with three colors (black, red and white) at the
bottom of each digit. Each color displays a random alphabet and thus to enter a four-digit
PIN, the user is required to enter a four-letter word from the keyboard corresponding to
the colors of each digit of the PIN (Figure 2.1b). The authors reported that even though
it was more secure and the error rate of ColorPIN was low compared to the standard
PIN-based scheme, it was almost ten times slower.
The proposed PIN-based systems discussed above are able to successfully address the
existing security issues related to PIN-based schemes. However, on the downside, almost
all of these authentication techniques still follow an all-or-nothing approach: users have to
authenticate or they cannot access anything. Also the improved security is provided at the
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cost of incurring an increase in the authentication times thereby negatively affecting the
usability of these schemes.
(a) SwiPIN [VZDLBH15] (b) ColorPIN [DLHH10]
Figure 2.1: Two recently proposed PIN-based authentication schemes.
Graphical Password Schemes
Recently, Locimetric systems have been proposed where the users have to identify specific
regions in an image to authenticate themselves. A popular example of such a system is
Passpoints by Wiedenbeck et al. [WWB+05] where users can select an arbitrary image and
then define a password through click points within the image. An important feature of
the Passpoints system is that the underlying images for a password can be selected by the
users and can even include complex real-world images. Locimetric authentication systems
were recently adopted by Microsoft in their Windows 8 operating system where the user
is required to draw a combinations of shapes on a picture selected by them. The usability
evaluation conducted by the authors and the results of the evaluation are promising with
respect to memorability of the graphical passwords. However, as reported by Thorpe et
al. [TvO07], these password schemes are not entirely attack-resistant and popular points
or “hot-spots” exist for many images, which can be exploited by an attacker. They found
that their attack strategy was quite successful and they were able to guess 36% of user
passwords within 231 guesses in one instance, and 20% of passwords within 233 guesses in
another.
Kwon and Na proposed TinyLock [KN14], which utilizes simple gestures to provide
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protection against shoulder surfing and smudge attacks. They addressed the problem by
using a small 3x3 grid thereby confining the smudge spots to a smaller region (Figure 2.2a).
Since smudges are confined to a small spot and are masked during this process, it became
difficult for an adversary to observe the passcode.
Users have reported positive experiences during preliminary evaluations of these schemes
[KN14, WWB+05]. However, as reported in these studies, since these systems are relatively
new, it took some time for the first time users in understanding and using these password
systems effectively. Another drawback of these systems is that the authentication times for
these schemes are relatively high compared to the authentication times of existing schemes.
Gesture-Based Password Schemes
AirAuth presented by Aumi et al. [AK14] is a biometric authentication technique that
uses in-air gesture input to authenticate users. They tracked the hand gesture input by
the user using a short-range depth camera and used the features collected to decode the
user’s authentication secret. They were able to achieve an average accuracy of 99.6% using
a predefined gesture set in an equal-error rate (EER) based study. Similar to our study,
they analyzed the usability of their proposed system in three different scenarios — private
(e.g., home), office, and public (e.g., around strangers) environments. Their proposed
system received a higher usage acceptability rating in all the three scenarios compared to
the pattern lock authentication technique found on Android devices.
Another related work is SnapApp [BHVZ+16], which is a primary authentication mech-
anism that provides a trade-off between security and usability. It presents a user with two
unlock methods on the device screen — a PIN for secure access to the entire device and
a simple slide gesture for fast yet temporary access (30 seconds or less) to the device
(Figure 2.2b). Furthermore, a blacklist can be configured by the user to exclude apps
that can be launched during the fast access to the device. Similar to our work, SnapApp
favors usability at the cost of security; however, we feel that evaluating this scheme for
re-authentication may introduce confounding factors as it has not been adopted widely.
To the best of our knowledge, we perform the first ever evaluation of modified primary
authentication schemes for re-authentication scenarios.
2.2 Re-Authentication Scenarios
To mitigate the usability issues with the traditional authentication schemes, several re-
search proposals have been put forth that reduce the authentication overhead of the users
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(a) TinyLock [KN14] (b) SnapApp [BHVZ+16]
Figure 2.2: Two recently proposed gesture-based authentication schemes.
by leveraging user behavior [LZX13, SNJC10, XZL14], device context [HDA+13, MJB+15,
MHK+14] or the sensitivity of launched apps [HRS+12]. We provided a brief overview of
these schemes in Section 1.2. We describe some of the related work in these areas below.
2.2.1 Implicit Authentication
Implicit Authentication (IA) makes use of the information collected by numerous sensors
present on smartphones to continuously authenticate the device user in the background. IA
creates a behavior-based profile of users and then monitors real-time device usage to detect
any anomalous user behavior. Various IA schemes have been proposed that authenticate
users through their touch input behavior [FBM+13, LZX13, XZL14], keystroke behavior
[DZZ13, FZCS13, GMCB14], gait behavior [FMP10, MM13] and device usage behavior
[SNJC10, SYJ+11].
Li et al. [LZX13] proposed a continuous and unobservable biometric re-authentication
scheme using touch input of the user. They used the sliding right, left, up, down and tap
gesture to classify the behavior of the user as they found these to be the most common
gestures (88%) of all the gestures. They conducted their study on a rooted device and
the SVM-based authentication used by them was able to attain a classification accuracy
of 95%. Similar to Li et al., Touchalytics proposed by Frank et al. [FBM+13] exploits
scrolling as a biometric for classifying the user behavior. They used k-nearest neighbors
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and SVM-based classification to study and classify the correlation between 22 analytic
features from touch traces. They were able to achieve positive results with equal error
rate (EER) between 0% and 4% using a window size of 13 swipes. Recent studies have
also highlighted the high classification accuracy of keystroke-based classifiers, which uses
keystroke behavior, such as inter-key delay or key-holding time, to authenticate the users.
Giuffrida et al. [GMCB14] used motion measurements from sensors such as accelerometer
and gyroscope along with keystroke behavior to authenticate users. They characterized
the typing behavior of users via unique sensor features and relied on standard machine
learning techniques to perform user authentication. They evaluated their proposed system
with 20 participants and found that sensor-enhanced authentication mechanism improved
the accuracy of keystroke dynamics (EER is around 7%).
However, in contrast to knowledge-based password techniques such as PINs or pattern
based schemes, which are deterministic, the classifications performed during behavioral
biometrics are based on heuristics and thus can have high false rejection rates. Incorrectly
denying access is extremely annoying and can quickly lead to user opt-out. Our proposed
lock configurations aim to reduce this annoyance by giving users some time before display-
ing an authentication prompt instead of abruptly locking them out. During the usability
evaluation of a behavior-based scheme, Khan et al. [KHV15] observed the usability issues
arising from re-authentications due to false rejects. They listed some suggestions given
by their participants to mitigate the negative usability effects of re-authentications. One
suggestion was to not interrupt the user and instead send an email alert or take a picture
of the perpetrator. Another, more secure suggestion that inspired this work was to authen-
ticate the user in a smaller portion of the screen in parallel and to offer the user a grace
period before the device locks out.
2.2.2 Context-Aware Authentication
Context-aware authentication may integrate many factors in authenticating users including
their device usage behavior, surrounding environment or information from various contex-
tual sources such as current location, proximity to Bluetooth, WiFi devices. For example,
Shi et al. [SNJC10] proposed an authentication scheme that calculates an authentication
score based on the user’s recent activity such as the logs of messages sent, calls made and
the location of the person using the device. They classified the events as good or bad and
updated the authentication score accordingly. A good event could be a call made to a
known number or the presence of the user at a known location. A bad event, on the other
hand, could be a call made to an unknown number. The method of evaluating the au-
thentication score was based on increasing the score when positive/good events occur and
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decreasing the score in case of bad events. Re-authentication of the users maybe required
for this scheme in case many bad events take place leading to a low authentication score.
Egelman et al. [EJP+14] conducted a study to understand participants’ perceptions
regarding the sensitivity of the data stored on their smartphones. They found that 25% of
the participants locked their devices to protect it from being accessed by friends and family
members. Hayashi et al. [HRS+12] showed that all-or-nothing access to smartphones does
not align with user preferences. The participants who locked their devices wanted about
half of the applications to be unlocked and always accessible. In safe, known locations or
around family members, the authors proposed to either disable authentication or to make
it simpler to increase usability. We consider their recommendation to take into account
the surrounding environment and the application being used to decide whether to lock the
screen or not.
2.3 Summary
Our research focus is to investigate different configurations of a subset of the different types
of authentication schemes (PIN and pattern-lock) for re-authentication purposes and not to
address previously uncovered usability issues (e.g., time consuming, considered unnecessary
for some cases [HVZF+14]) with these schemes. Though the recently proposed systems
provide a viable alternative for authenticating users securely, we use popular authentication
techniques for re-authentication in our study. We believe that the usability perceptions of
the participants might get biased due to their missing experience with these new schemes.
We aim to make sure that participants evaluate different configurations of an authentication
scheme that they are already familiar with in our study. We take into consideration both
the usability and security requirements of the users while designing the configurations. Our
aim is to allow a convenient re-authentication experience for the users and at the same
time make sure their personal data on the device including their passcodes remain secure.
Considering the design recommendations given by earlier work [EJP+14, HRS+12], we
deploy a context-dependent locking approach and evaluate the configurations for different
scenarios and mobile applications.
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Chapter 3
Lock Configuration
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether existing authentication schemes
can be modified to make them more usable for re-authentication scenarios without signifi-
cantly compromising on security. In order to make it convenient for users to re-authenticate,
we modify the default lock configuration by varying the screen transparency and the delay
of the appearance of the re-authentication prompt. To this end, we evaluate the effect of
introducing two configuration parameters for existing authentication prompts: time delay
and screen transparency. In this chapter, we outline the security and usability trade-offs in-
troduced by these parameters, our constructions of re-authentication prompts with different
configurations of these parameters and the usability expectations from our constructions.
3.1 Configuration Parameters
The time delay represents the delay in the appearance of the re-authentication-prompt
after a configuration has been activated. The re-authentication-prompt refers to a numeric
keypad in case of PIN lock and a 3-by-3 grid in case of a pattern lock which can be used
to enter a passcode. The time delay variable supports two possible values: immediate lock
(Imm-Lock) and gradual lock (Grad-Lock). In the Imm-Lock case, the re-authentication
prompt appears immediately (without any delay) whereas for the Grad-Lock case, the
re-authentication prompt appears after a predefined interval with a fade-in effect. During
this fade-in, the user can continue to interact with the current task. The two possible
values provide different usability and security trade-offs: the secure Imm-Lock bars the
user immediately from interacting with the current task, while the less secure Grad-Lock
is not abrupt and provides the user with an opportunity to interact with the current
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task during the grace period thereby potentially allowing the user to reduce the effect of
interruption. For example, the user can finish reading a sentence or complete writing his
thoughts down while writing an email before getting locked out.
For our experiments, we chose a four-second time delay. Our selection was based
on the results from previous studies and our experiments with both shorter and longer
delays. Ferreira et al.’s [FGK+14] study on understanding micro-usage patterns for various
smartphone apps revealed that 40% of the application usage lasts less than 15 seconds
and is sufficient for a user to read or reply to a message. In a study conducted by Yan
et al. [YCG+12], they find that 50% of the smartphone interactions last fewer than 30
seconds. With such brief periods of interactions, it is therefore necessary to lock the device
quickly to prevent any misuse. For the grace period, we considered and tested delays
between two to seven seconds. During our empirical tests with four participants, we found
that the four-second delay period allowed the participants to prepare for re-authentication
prompts. The shorter delay values did not provide the users with enough time to prepare
for the re-authentication prompt, whereas the longer delay values made the users anxious
in anticipation of the re authentication prompt.
The screen transparency variable controls the visibility of the current task by configuring
the background of the re-authentication prompt to remain transparent (Imm-Trans, see
Figure 3.1a and 3.1d), be instantaneously dark (Imm-Dark, see Figure 3.1b and 3.1e) or
gradually fade from transparent to dark (Grad-Dark, Figure 3.1c and 3.1f). Similar to
the time delay variable, the three possible states of screen transparency provide varying
degrees of security and usability. The Imm-Dark state is the most secure one because
it hides sensitive data being displayed in the current task; however, the context-switch
overhead should be the most in this case since the user’s task is not visible anymore. The
Imm-Trans state covers the other extreme where sensitive data displayed in the current task
remains visible behind the re-authentication prompt; however, the context-switch overhead
should be the least since the user’s task remains visible while the user is interacting with
the re-authentication prompt. The Grad-Dark state provides a grace period (default period
length is 10 seconds) during which the user can authenticate to resume the task at hand;
however, if the user fails to do so in a configurable amount of time, the background of the
re-authentication prompt becomes dark thereby hiding the user’s current task.
3.2 Proposed Configurations
The four configurations of re-authentication prompts that we construct using the differ-
ent meaningful combinations of the two configuration parameters discussed above are as
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(a) Imm-Trans (b) Imm-Dark (c) Grad-Dark
Pattern Lock Configurations
(d) Imm-Trans (e) Imm-Dark (f) Grad-Dark
PIN Lock Configurations
Figure 3.1: The proposed configurations with varying values for screen transparency.
Figures (a), (b) and (c) show the three possible values when a pattern-lock based re-
authentication prompt is used. Figures (d), (e) and (f) show the three possible values
when a PIN-lock based re-authentication prompt is used. For the Grad-Dark configura-
tion, the background of the re-authentication prompt gradually turns from transparent to
dark.
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follows:
1. Immediate Dark, Immediate Lock (Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock): We evaluate the
default lock scheme on most Android smartphones to establish a baseline for when
it is used for re-authentication. In this configuration, the re-authentication prompt
appears immediately with a dark background, which completely hides the content of
the current task, and the user can no longer view and interact with the current task.
The re-authentication prompt asks the user to enter a PIN or pattern-lock and the
user is able to access the current task again only after entering a correct passcode.
This configuration was also used in the earlier work by Khan et al. [KHV15], as
discussed in Section 1.3.
2. Immediate Transparent, Immediate Lock (Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock): The re-
authentication prompt appears immediately in this configuration and the user can no
longer interact with the current task once this configuration is activated. However,
the background of the re-authentication prompt remains transparent, which allows
users to observe the content of the current task.
3. Gradual Dark, Immediate Lock (Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock): In this configura-
tion, the re-authentication prompt appears immediately and the user can no longer
interact with the current task. Furthermore, the background of the re-authentication
prompt is initially transparent and the contents of the current task are visible. The
background of the re-authentication prompt gradually fades into a dark screen and
hides the contents of the current task from the user. If the user manages to authen-
ticate before the screen has darkened completely, this configuration keeps the user’s
current task visible in the background.
4. Gradual Dark, Gradual Lock (Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock): In terms of task vis-
ibility, this configuration is similar to the Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration de-
scribed above. That is, the background of the re-authentication prompt is initially
transparent and then turns dark gradually. However, this configuration also allows
the user to continue interacting with the current task for a grace-period of four sec-
onds before the re-authentication prompt appears. During the four-second grace
period, the brightness of the current task is reduced to indicate the forthcoming re-
authentication prompt to the user. After the re-authentication prompt appears, the
users can no longer interact with their task.
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3.2.1 Other Possible Configurations
There are other possible combinations of the two configuration parameters, which we did
not evaluate for re-authentication purposes. We discuss these configurations and our rea-
sons for dismissing them below:
1. Immediate Transparent, Gradual Lock (Imm-Trans-Grad-Lock): The back-
ground of the re-authentication prompt turns and stays transparent allowing a visual
clue of the task to the users. The re-authentication prompt appears after a delay
giving them some time to interact with the task. This configuration is relatively
insecure compared to the other configurations discussed in the previous section. An
adversary can use the grace period to his advantage by browsing to a particular place
in the task and then read through the displayed text even after the app locks him
out.
2. Immediate Dark, Gradual Lock (Imm-Dark-Grad-Lock): The background of
the re-authentication prompt immediately turns dark obscuring the content of the
task. Also the re-authentication prompt appears after a delay as in the previous
case. However, the grace period in this case is useless as it does not assist users
in completing their tasks because the content of the background task is completely
hidden.
3.3 Alternate Lock Configurations
While designing the re-authentication configurations, we considered a few other possible
ways to re-authenticate the users securely and conveniently. However, due to limited time,
we were not able to evaluate the other proposed configurations. Below, we list some of the
other configurations we considered to re-authenticate the users.
3.3.1 Split Screen
We designed and modified the lock configurations discussed in Section 3.2 by positioning
the re-authentication prompt at the bottom of the screen instead of placing it in the center
of the screen. The motivation behind this placement of the prompt was to assist the users
enter the passcode comfortably because during this arrangement, the keys would be closer
to the fingers while holding the device. Also in the split screen configuration, since the
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authentication prompt is placed at the bottom, a larger portion of the screen is available
to the users to read/write any content during the grace period.
Similar to the re-authentication configurations mentioned in Section 3.2, we designed
and implemented different split screen configurations with varying values of the time delay
and screen transparency parameters as shown in Figure 3.2. While the screen transparency
parameter for both Imm-Trans (Figure 3.2a) and Imm-Dark (Figure 3.2b) cases were simi-
lar to the originally proposed lock configurations, we modified the Grad-Dark (Figure 3.2c)
configuration such that instead of gradually turning the screen dark, we used a vertical
slider to gradually hide the content displayed on the top half of the screen.
The split screen configurations provides an alternative re-authentication configuration
by placing the authentication prompt at the bottom of the screen. These configurations
can be used along with our proposed configurations as well to give the smartphone users
an option to select their preferred re-authentication prompt placement.
3.3.2 Notifying the User
We also looked into ways to notify the users when their device is being used by someone else
and the re-authentication prompt is activated. Some of the ways to inform the users could
be to send an email or an SMS to an alternate email address or to an alternate phone
number pre-registered by the device owner. Since the device owner does not have the
device, it is unlikely that he will be able to get the email/SMS if it is sent to their original
email address or phone number. We can provide basic information to the user through the
email or SMS such as the time and the reason for activating the re-authentication prompt.
However, as reported in Section 5.3.2, we found that some of the study participants wanted
to get detailed information about the device user instead, including the number of unlock
attempts made, any identifying characteristic behavioral information of the user that can
be used to identify him such as the touch input information or the browsing activity of
the user around the time the re-authentication prompt was activated. Some participants
even wanted the device to take a picture of the user using the front camera and save it
on the device so that it can be checked by the device owner later. These notification
techniques can be used in addition to using the lock configurations thereby providing
additional information to the users apart from simply locking the device.
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(a) Imm-Trans (b) Imm-Dark
(c) Grad-Dark
Figure 3.2: The proposed Split Screen configurations with varying values for screen trans-
parency
3.3.3 Alternative Re-authentication Techniques
Previous studies [DLVZH09, DLVZN+13] have proposed alternate ways to authenticate
users apart from the most commonly used authentication methods which ask users to en-
ter a PIN or a pattern to authenticate themselves. Many proposed alternatives use the
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additional hardware capabilities of the device. For example, in VibraPass [DLVZH09], the
user has to enter an incorrect digit or character whenever the device vibrates thus pro-
viding protection from a shoulder-surfing attack. Back of Device (BoD) Authentication
proposed by De Luca et al. [DLVZN+13] is one of the other ways of implementing security
by enforcing secrecy and confidentiality of the pass-code. Their proposed scheme allow
users to enter their pre-selected gesture using the back of the device in order to authen-
ticate themselves. Though the above techniques have a few limitations such as passcode
memorability issues or hardware limitations, the above authentication techniques provide
possible alternative ways to users to re-authenticate themselves.
3.3.4 Context-Based Configurations
Many systems use individuals’ behavioral information to authenticate them. Over time, a
system can collect information about the way a given user interacts with the device such as
their keystroke dynamics, swipe inputs or motion patterns. In case the system notices any
suspicious behavioral activity, it may lock the device to re-authenticate the user. Instead
of locking the device right away, it can collect additional input from the user and re-classify
their behavioral information to re-authenticate them. For example, for touch-based and
keystroke-based behavioral biometrics, it can give additional tasks to the user to collect
more touch and keystroke input from the users to classify their behavior. Such types of
re-authentication tasks will be really helpful in cases where the device user is not the actual
owner of the device but is close to the owner such as a family member or a close friend
and therefore may already know the passcode. However, implementing these tasks so that
it is convenient and least annoying for the users will be a challenge and presents a good
opportunity for future work in this area.
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Chapter 4
User Study
In this chapter, we outline our design of a user study to evaluate the four re-authentication
prompt configurations. To measure the properties of each configuration, we perform a
lab-based evaluation where participants are invited to experience each configuration by
performing predefined synthetic tasks. After the users experience these configurations, they
are asked to rate and provide qualitative feedback in terms of usability, security perception
and their willingness to use these configurations. In addition to the user feedback, we
measure the task efficiency, context switch overhead, and task error rate against each
configuration. Our evaluation and feedback setup are designed to elicit the efficacy of these
configurations for re-authentication in different scenarios. Our study was reviewed and has
received approval from the Office of Research Ethics (ORE) of our university. We now
provide details of our study design in terms of experimental setup and our methodology.
4.1 Apparatus
While several use cases exist for re-authentication (see Section 1.2), we choose implicit au-
thentication (IA) as the representative use case in this work. Our choice of IA is motivated
by the prior work of Khan et al. [KHV15] in the IA domain that highlights the issues with
re-authentications in case of false rejects. To ensure that each participant experiences a
certain number of false rejects, we use a simulated IA scheme, as was also done by Khan
et al. In particular, our scheme simulates IA schemes based on a user’s touch input or
keystroke behavior.
For our experiments, we select two widely used authentication mechanisms on Android:
a four-digit PIN and the Android pattern-lock (with the same constraints on possible
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patterns as in Android). The user interface of both schemes is similar to the Android lock
screens (see Figure 3.1). We use Hai Bison’s pattern lock library1 to develop a pattern lock
for each of the lock schemes and use a user interface similar to Android for developing the
PIN lock.
The four re-authentication prompt configurations introduced in Section 3.2 are eval-
uated using two synthetic activities — a text entry activity and an email activity (see
Figure 4.1). We choose these activities since they represent common smartphone activities
(i.e., reading and composing emails and text messages or interacting with social media
apps).
(a) Text Entry Activity (b) Email Activity
Figure 4.1: The activities performed by the participants during the user study. Figure (a)
shows the text entry activity containing a twelve-digit number and Figure (b) shows the
email activity.
• Text entry activity: This activity displays a twelve-digit number to the partic-
ipants. It also contains a text box and the users are asked to enter the displayed
number in the text box using the numeric keyboard of the device.
• Email activity: In the email activity, users are asked to read an email in an email
app. The user interface for the email app developed for this activity looks similar
to the Android Gmail app. Once a participant has read the email, they are asked
1https://bitbucket.org/haibison/android-lockpattern
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to answer a multiple choice question related to the email on a laptop. The emails
composed for this activity contained sensitive data, which emphasized the need to
protect the emails from adversaries (see Figure 4.1b for an example).
The design of the text entry activity ensures that the interaction of the users with the
app can be measured, which enables us to compute several metrics in terms of context-
switch overhead and errors made by the users. For the email activity, since the emails
contain sensitive material, the users performing the email activity should consider the
security implications of a re-authentication prompt configuration in addition to its usability
aspects.
These activities are bundled in two separate Android apps, which allow users to perform
tasks. We define a task as completing the text entry or the email activity along with a
mid-task re-authentication of the user using either the PIN or the pattern-lock in one of
the four configurations. For the text entry task, the users are interrupted at predefined
intervals, which are triggered based on the key presses by the users. The number of key
presses required to trigger re-authentication vary across different text entry tasks for each
user but it stays constant across users for those tasks for results to be comparable. Similar
to the text entry task, the users are interrupted with a re-authentication prompt after a
predefined number of swipes for the email task. The apps are instrumented to gather the
timestamps of events, including input events by the user and the display and dismissal
events of the re-authentication prompts. The apps also collects the errors made by the
users for the text entry activity and during the re-authentication. We also log the user
interactions, including the keystrokes and screen touch events, during the grace period for
the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration. The data collected by the apps is instrumental
in computing the task completion rate, context switch overhead and the error rate against
each re-authentication prompt configuration.
4.2 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate the four re-authentication prompt configurations using the text entry and
email tasks. Each scheme was evaluated in a round that consisted of four text entry tasks
and two email tasks. Each user was subjected to five rounds and in each round a different
re-authentication prompt configuration was evaluated. For the first round, the participants
performed the tasks without any authentication, which allowed us to establish a baseline.
The participants were allowed to take a break between each task and each round. The
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order of the four re-authentication prompt configurations was randomly chosen for the
participants.
The participants shortlisted for this study were invited for an hour-long lab-based study.
The participants were first asked to fill a demographic survey which asked about their
age, gender, and current occupation. They were then asked to fill a security preferences
survey. In terms of security preferences, we asked the participants about their device
locking habits, their preferred authentication scheme, and the adversaries that they wanted
protection against. These pre-study surveys are provided in Appendix A. After the pre-
study surveys, the participants were introduced to IA and the possibility of false rejects in
IA using a short 3-minute Youtube video2. We also gave a brief description about the tasks
and apps used during the study, and the different re-authentication prompt configurations.
The participants were also told that false rejects were simulated for the purpose of this
study. We gave participants the option to select their preferred lock scheme (PIN or
pattern-lock) and a corresponding secret for the study. We did not assign participants a
specific scheme to avoid any bias due to their inexperience with it. This design decision
prohibited us to counterbalance the authentication methods. The authentication times
varied across participants. To cater for this, we report within-subject relative differences
instead of absolute values. The participants then experienced the different configurations
in multiple rounds. After the completion of each round, they were asked to rate the
usability and perceived security of the configuration that they experienced and to give an
overall ranking in terms of their preferences by taking both the usability and the security
of the evaluated configuration into account. Participants were also asked to indicate their
preferences for the evaluated configurations under different device usage scenarios and
were subjected to a semi-structured interview to gain further insight into their feedback.
A researcher was present to respond to any questions the participants had.
4.3 User Feedback
The evaluated schemes trade off security for usability and since different users have different
security preferences for different apps and different scenarios, we sought feedback from the
users against four apps for three different scenarios. A previous study has shown that users
prefer a strict security setting for financial and email apps, which contain highly sensitive
data, whereas they prefer a relatively relaxed security setting for contacts and other utility
apps [HRS+12]. We sought feedback from the users for four apps: a banking app, an email
2http://youtu.be/HUR2-bxBtI8
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app, a photos app, and a contacts app. These apps are commonly used and contain varying
levels of sensitive data of the smartphone user. The participants were asked to consider
the following device usage scenarios with the aforementioned apps available on the device.
• Bus Scenario: The participants had to consider a situation where they are traveling
on a bus and they accidentally leave their smartphone behind. A stranger picks up
their device and starts using it.
• Office Scenario: This scenario asks the participants to consider a work environment
where one of their colleagues starts using their device when it is left unattended. For
this scenario, the apps on the device may be used for a limited time by someone
known by the smartphone owner.
• Home Scenario: In this scenario, we asked the participants to consider that their
spouse accesses their device while it is left unattended or when they are asleep. The
number of adversaries is limited in this scenario as compared to the others and the
users may or may not want to protect their data from their spouse.
A researcher presented the scenarios to the participants and was available during the
interview to answer any questions participants may have. Participants were given sufficient
time to consider the presented scenarios. For each scenario, the participants were told that
the re-authentication prompt would get activated in case the system notices any suspicious
activity. We also reminded them of false rejects and the fact that they may be subjected
to re-authentication while they are using the device. In order to inquire about the security
perception of an evaluated re-authentication prompt configuration, the participants were
told that for the purpose of these scenarios, they should consider that only IA is protecting
their device. Since different users may have different security preferences for each configu-
ration and each usage scenario, we initially asked the users to establish the sensitive nature
of the apps and usage scenarios. Then the participants were asked to provide feedback in
terms of security perception, usability and preferred re-authentication prompt configura-
tion for each of the four apps under each of the three device usage scenarios. The feedback
questionnaire is provided in Appendix B.
Finally, at the end of the study, we conducted a short semi-structured interview (pro-
vided in Appendix C) to gain insight into participants’ overall impression of the configu-
rations that they evaluated.
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4.4 Hypotheses
We had some expectations from our proposed re-authentication configurations before we
began the user study. Our hypotheses were as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock is the most obstructive therefore it should be
the most annoying for the users.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Since Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock provides no visual clues of the current
task to the user, the task efficiency should be reduced during this configuration as compared
to other configurations.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock has similar properties as Imm-Trans-Imm-
Lock but it provides additional security by making the current task of the user invisible
after a predefined time interval. Therefore, it should score similar to Imm-Trans-Imm-
Lock in terms of usability with a relatively better security perception.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock enables the user to interact with the current
task during the grace period and this may increase the task efficiency of the users.
4.5 Participant Sample
We advertised the study through the university-wide mailing list and the university’s grad-
uate student research portal. The study was advertised with the title “Evaluating authen-
tication schemes for smartphones” and we recruited only those users for the study who had
some experience using smartphones. Interested participants contacted us via email and we
asked them to come to our lab at a fixed time which was decided mutually. Each user
study typically lasted between 40 minutes and an hour. We audio-recorded the responses
of the participants throughout the study. A researcher was available throughout the study
to answer any questions that the participants had. Each participant received $10 for taking
part in the study.
We recruited 30 participants for the study (see Table 4.1 for their demographics). All
the participants were students from our university. Our sample included 12 male and 18
female participants. Most of our participants belonged to the age group 21–25 years (57%)
and either had a bachelor’s degree (37%) or a master’s degree (27%) from some university.
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N=30
Gender 60% Females
40% Males
Age 33% Under 20 years
57% 21–25 years
7% 26–30 years
3% 31–35 years
Education 37% Bachelor’s Degree
27% Master’s Degree
20% Some college
13% High School/GED
3% Ph.D., Law or Medical Degree
Occupation 100% Student
Table 4.1: Demographic information of the participants.
The majority of our participants (87%) reported that they used a lock scheme on
their device. The security preferences of participants regarding their device lock usage
are provided in Table 4.2. Out of the participants who locked their device (26/30), the
majority of them used a pattern lock (50%) followed by using a fingerprint recognition
(23%) to protect their device from being accessed by someone else. Almost all participants
except one wanted to protect their device from strangers. We asked the four participants
who did not lock their devices for their reason to do so: two indicated that they had
nothing to protect, two wanted their emergency contacts to be available and one considered
authentication to be inconvenient (multiple answers were possible).
Also we report the perception of the participants regarding IA in Table 4.3. As expected,
all but three participants had no clue about IA. Also the three participants claimed that
they had heard about IA in the past but did not have much knowledge about it. After
the participants came to know about IA through the video, they responded positively to
the idea of being implicitly authenticated and most of the participants were interested in
using IA on their devices.
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N=30
Lock 26 (87%) Yes
device? 4 (13%) No
13/26 Pattern Lock
Authentication 5/26 PIN (4 digits)
scheme 6/26 Fingerprint recognition
2/26 Password
Protecting 25/26 Strangers
from? 16/26 Friends
14/26 Room-mate
14/26 Coworker
3/26 Spouse, own children
Reasons for
not using any
authentication
scheme
2/4 Don’t have any data to protect
2/4 Allow others to use the device
in emergency
1/4 Takes time to unlock the de-
vice
Table 4.2: Device lock usage pattern of the participants.
N=30
Know about 10% Somewhat know about it
IA? 90% Have no clue about IA
Want to use
IA?
4/30 Willing to replace current
scheme with IA
(After seeing
the video)
13/30 Willing to use IA in addition
to the current authentication
scheme
10/30 May use it
2/30 Not willing to use it
1/30 Not sure
Table 4.3: Participants’ perceptions about IA.
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Chapter 5
Findings
We recorded and analyzed the data collected through the user studies and the interviews.
We also transcribed the audio responses of the participants. We report both the quantita-
tive and the qualitative results from the study in this chapter. For statistical significance,
we used paired t-tests when comparing continuous data for the within-subjects condition
such as the inter-stroke rate for each user between grace and non-grace periods. We used
one-way ANOVA when comparing continuous data for the within-subjects condition for
the four authentication configurations (e.g., context-switch overhead). We used chi-squared
tests when comparing participants’ responses to categorical Likert-type questions.
5.1 Quantitative Results
All 30 participants performed the text entry activity and the email activity while experi-
encing the four configurations. Out of the 30 participants, 18 participants chose to use a
pattern-lock during the study, while the remaining participants chose to use a PIN. Par-
ticipants were subjected to five rounds in total. During the first round, participants were
not interrupted for re-authentication. This round was used to establish a baseline and we
use the term BaseRound to refer to it. For the remaining rounds, participants tested one
of the four configurations in each round.
During each round, participants completed four text entry tasks and two email tasks.
They re-authenticated once for every email and text entry task during all rounds except
BaseRound. The high rate of re-authentication is not representative of a real-world sce-
nario; however, our motivation was to get participants acquainted with the configurations
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and to collect sufficient data to evaluate the metrics used in this section. Overall, during
the study each participant re-authenticated themselves 16 times during the text entry ac-
tivity (four times per configuration) and eight times during the email activity (twice per
configuration). In total, we logged 120 re-authentication events, 120 text entry tasks and
60 email tasks per configuration for all 30 participants.
5.1.1 Effect on Task Completion Overhead
The task completion time is the time taken by the users to complete a text entry or an
email task. It also includes the time taken by the users to re-authenticate themselves while
evaluating one of the configurations. The task completion overhead is the additional time
taken to complete a text entry task as compared to the BaseRound in which a user is not
interrupted to re-authenticate. For the task completion overhead, we only take into account
the text entry activity since the emails used for the email activity were of a different nature
and length during each round. Our goal is to find if there are any re-authentication prompt
configurations that assist the users in completing their text entry tasks faster.
We found that on average users took three to four seconds longer when they had to
re-authenticate during a text entry task (see Figure 5.1). We conducted a one-way be-
tween subjects ANOVA to compare the effect of the four configurations on the task com-
pletion overhead, which indicated no significant differences across the four configurations
(F(3,116)=2.31, p=0.08).
Discussion: Our expectation that the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration is less effi-
cient as compared to the modified re-authentication prompt configurations turns out to
be incorrect. Though we did not find any significant differences in the performance of
the configurations, the participants mentioned during the study that they felt that their
performance was affected during the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration:
“It kind of freaks me out because it is too sudden, it slows down whatever I
was doing.” (P4)
5.1.2 Effect on Context Switch Overhead
Context switch overhead for the text entry task is defined as the time taken by the users
to resume their text entry task once they have re-authenticated. Except the BaseRound,
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Figure 5.1: Task completion overhead time for the text entry activity relative to the
BaseRound (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals).
during all other rounds the participants were interrupted during the task and received a
re-authentication prompt. The context switch overhead is represented by the time inter-
val between the dismissal of the re-authentication prompt and the first key press on the
text entry task once the re-authentication prompt has disappeared. It was not possible
to compute this metric for the email task because after re-authenticating a user would
complete reading the email text visible on the screen before interacting with the device.
Despite our expectation that a visual of the user task in the background would reduce the
context switch overhead, the context switch overhead across different re-authentication
prompt configurations is comparable and contains no statistically significant differences
(F(3,116)=1.15, p=0.33) as shown in Figure 5.2.
Discussion: While no statistically significant differences were observed, during the
interviews, most users found the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration to be abrupt and
reported that it was difficult to resume their task after re-authentication:
“I lost my place [context] on what I was doing before [the lock appeared], so it
is my least favourite. It would be too frustrating for me for everyday use, so I
would rather take the risk.” (P9)
“You can’t prepare for what’s going to come. It takes more time to pick up
after unlock” (P10)
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Figure 5.2: Context switch overhead time for the text entry activity (Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals).
Figure 5.3: Inter-key interval for the text entry activity (Error bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals). The top bar represents the inter-key interval for the Grad-Dark-Grad-
Lock configuration during the grace period.
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5.1.3 Effect of Grace Period
We allowed a grace period of four seconds for the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration.
During the grace period the participants could continue working on their task for four
seconds before getting locked out. We observe that all participants took advantage of this
grace period by continuing their work during the text entry activity. The average task
completion time for the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration was 13 seconds and we found
that on an average users entered 38% of the text during the four second grace period with
some users entering up to 60% of the total text in the grace period. A similar trend was
observed for the email task where 23% of the swipe events occurred during this period
(average time to complete the email task for the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration was
41 seconds).
We find that the inter-key intervals (time interval between two consecutive key presses)
of the users reduced significantly for the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration during the
grace period. The average inter-key interval of users reduced by almost 60% during the
grace period when compared to the average inter-key interval during the task (see Fig-
ure 5.3). A paired t-test was conducted to compare the inter-key interval between the
grace and non-grace period for the same text entry activity for each user. The results show
that inter-key intervals are significantly different between the grace and non-grace period
(t(29)=2.1, p=0.04).
Discussion: The participants took advantage of the grace period by attempting to
quickly complete the text entry activity. They typed faster than their normal speeds
during the grace period.
5.1.4 Effect on Task Error Rate
In case the input of the users mismatched the displayed text for the text entry task,
we counted it as an error (with at most one error per task). Since each user completed
four tasks per configuration, we compute the average number of tasks per configuration
where users made one or more error(s). Overall, our results indicate that users made
errors in 77 out of 600 text entry tasks presented to them. However, a one-way between
subjects ANOVA for the task error rate across the four configurations and BaseRound
indicates no significant differences (F(4,145)=1.51, p=0.2). Similarly, while participants
made errors in 43 out of 240 email tasks, the differences were not significant across the
different configurations (F(4,28)=0.28, p=0.84).
As shown in Figure 5.4, we find that the minimum number of errors were committed
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Figure 5.4: Average task error rate for the text entry activity. Vertical axis represents the
task error rate per configuration. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)
by the users during the BaseRound when they were not interrupted by an authentication
prompt while entering the digits. Overall 20 out of 30 users did not make any error in any of
the four tasks during the BaseRound. It was followed by 18/30 and 17/30 users not making
an error in any of the tasks during the Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock and Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock
configurations respectively. Interestingly, the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration had a
very high task error rate with almost 66% users entering at-least one incorrect digit during
at least one of the four tasks when this configuration was presented to them (see Figure 5.4).
On an average, the task error rate during the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock configuration was 70%
higher than the task error rate during the BaseRound with some users even making 6-7
incorrect key presses during the same task.
Next we compute the error rate during the email task by verifying the answer selected
by the users after they read an email. The users gave their responses to multiple choice
questions after reading the emails. Each incorrect answer during a task contributed to the
error rate for the configuration experienced during that task. Overall, a total of 43 email
tasks had an error out of a total of 240 email tasks presented to them. However, similar to
the text entry tasks, the differences were not significant across the different configurations.
Discussion: The task error rate among the configurations were comparable. Though
the inter-key interval of the users during the grace period reduced significantly, it may have
affected the task error rate compared to the other configurations.
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Figure 5.5: App sensitivity rating given by the participants.
5.2 Qualitative Results
For the apps evaluated in this work, 100%, 73%, 60% and 30% of the participants consid-
ered the banking, email, photo and contacts app to be sensitive, respectively. As shown in
Figure 5.5, while the banking app was considered to be very sensitive by all the users, the
sensitivity preference for other apps varied across users. The responses to the pre-study
question regarding the adversaries that the participants (who used device lock) wanted
protection against indicate that different scenarios require different levels of protection.
As outlined in Section 4.5, almost all users wanted protection against strangers, which
corresponds to the bus scenario. Corresponding to the office scenario, 54% of participants
wanted protection against co-workers. On the other hand only 11% of participants consid-
ered that they needed protection against family members, which corresponds to the home
scenario.
“Contacts are not a big deal for me because most likely they [strangers] will
not know who they [contacts] are.” (P5)
“Emails might be more sensitive especially about my jobs, so I don’t want my
co-worker to know anything about that.” (P6)
We now present the findings from the feedback of the participants regarding the usabil-
ity and security perceptions of the four re-authentication prompt configurations for each
app in the different usage scenarios.
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Figure 5.6: User perceptions of the security of the four re-authentication prompt configu-
rations.
5.2.1 Security Perceptions
Figure 5.6 shows the security perceptions of the participants for each re-authentication
configuration. Significantly more (57% more) participants thought that the Imm-Dark-
Imm-Lock configuration was more secure than the other configurations (χ2(3) = 151, p <
0.001). Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock immediately hides the content on the screen to prevent the
leakage of any sensitive information. Some participants indicated that they would take
advantage of this increased security at the cost of usability for some apps:
“If I am sending an important email, I do not want anybody else to look at it
even for a second. It is annoying but it would be the most beneficial.” (P13)
This was followed by the Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration, which was considered to
be secure by 33% of the participants. The participants considered the immediate locking
of the app to be secure:
“I liked the idea that how the lock appears at the start [during Grad-Dark-
Imm-Lock], so if it is someone else, they can’t enter any text message and they
can’t send anything compared to the last scheme [Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock] where
they can do anything if they are fast enough” (P4)
The Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock and Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock scored poorly and only 13% and
7% of the participants considered them to be secure respectively. The security perceptions
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indicate that, as expected, the visibility of the user task in the background is perceived
negatively by the users in terms of security. We now explore whether the less secure
configurations were considered appropriate for some usage scenarios.
The Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration was perceived most secure and all participants
indicated that they would only consider using this configuration for their banking app on
a bus and at the office (see Figure 5.7). On the other hand, for the home scenario, users
had different preferences. 40% of the users indicated that they would still only consider
using the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration for the banking app at home while 23% of
the users indicated that they would prefer using the Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration.
Some of the user comments shed more light on the user preferences for the banking app:
“Banking would be very sensitive, so I want it to get dark as quickly as possi-
ble.” (P9)
“Even with my partner, I won’t feel completely secure with my banking app
opened on my phone that is why I would prefer immediate dark.” (P4)
The feedback from the users was inconclusive for the email app and there is no single
configuration that users significantly prefer over the other for the different usage scenarios.
On the other hand, for the photos app, the majority of the participants who considered the
photos app to be sensitive preferred the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration at the office
and for the bus scenario (Figure 5.8). For the office scenario, the participants who were
very concerned about protecting their photos preferred configurations that obscured or
gradually obscured the app, preventing it from being accessed by their co-workers:
“I won’t care about my photos with respect to a stranger but in office where
its more professional environment with the people I know, I would increase the
security of the scheme.” (P12)
“I have a lot of photos that are very personal and I don’t want them [strangers]
to see any part of them.” (P6)
“I might have already shared a lot of photos with my partner, so I would prefer
a comfortable lock scheme.” (P6)
For the contacts app, the participants were willing to use configurations that provided
device access for a period before locking them out. They wanted it so because this would
allow a stranger to contact them in case they lost their device. The participants were
less concerned about securing their contacts at home or office because they felt that they
shared contacts with individuals at these locations.
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(a) Home Scenario
(b) Office Scenario
Figure 5.7: User preference of the configurations for the banking app in different scenarios.
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(a) Home Scenario
(b) Office Scenario
Figure 5.8: User preferences for the configurations for the photos app in different scenarios.
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Figure 5.9: User perceptions on how easy it was to use the configurations.
“If someone picked up my phone and they are looking at my contacts, they
could try to return it to me through someone in my contacts, so I would choose
something except the one that turns dark immediately.” (P7)
“For contacts, now there is an issue of privacy because these are people which
they [office colleagues] might also know, so it is important that I protect their
information but at the same time I don’t want it to be very inconvenient for
me when I look at the contacts.” (P2)
Discussion: The participants considered the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration to be
the most secure out of all four configurations. The inclination of the users while selecting
the configurations are location- and app-based. While they prefer the Imm-Dark-Imm-
Lock configuration to protect their banking information, they prefer to protect access to
the photos app only at unknown locations. Users feel comfortable while browsing their
device at home, and care less about using a more secure configuration except for the
banking app.
5.2.2 Usability Perceptions
Our main goal while designing these configurations was to reduce the usability issues with
re-authentication reported by Khan et al. [KHV15]. To this end, our configurations pro-
vided the users a visual of their tasks or a grace period to continue their work without
disruption. We now present the perceived usability by the participants of these configura-
tions.
41
Figure 5.10: User perceptions regarding obstructiveness of the configurations.
We asked the users to rate the configurations in terms of ease of use. Figure 5.9
summarizes the responses of the users. We found that all configurations received a high
rating in terms of ease of use and there were no statistically significant differences among
the four configurations.In addition to a positive reception of the fade-in effect in Grad-Dark-
Grad-Lock, users utilized the grace period to input data. Some of the users’ comments
include:
“It helps you to continue typing and get your thoughts out. It didn’t allow
you to access the app though [after sometime] so it is a good balance between
usability and security.” (P16)
“If I was in a rush to send an email to a client or my boss, I wouldn’t want it to
immediately get dark, I would want that buffer time to carry on my thoughts.”
(P4)
We also asked users how obstructive and annoying they thought each configuration
was. Their responses (see Figure 5.10) indicate that significantly more participants consid-
ered the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration as more obstructive (χ2(3) = 96, p < 0.01).
Similarly, Figure 5.10 shows that significantly more participants considered the Imm-Dark-
Imm-Lock configuration was more annoying (χ2(3) = 71, p < 0.01). In terms of obstruc-
tiveness, 70% participants rated the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration as somewhat or
very obstructive and a 67% of participants rated it as somewhat or very annoying (Fig-
ure 5.11). This explains why Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock was least preferred configuration for
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Figure 5.11: User perceptions regarding annoyance of the configurations.
the users for email (47%), photos (52%) and contacts (47%) apps for the home scenario.
On the other hand, users positively perceived the gradual fading of the screen transparency
and the delay of the authentication prompt. User comments that reflect these findings are:
“I lost my place what I was doing before [the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock configura-
tion appeared], so it is my least favorite. It would be too frustrating for me for
everyday use, so I would rather take the risk.” (P9)
“I found it [Imm-Dark] very annoying because it was really an abrupt interrup-
tion to me, others were not abrupt.” (P8)
“When you were explaining to me, I thought it would be difficult to wait for
the lock [during Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock] but I guess it was nice to not lock right
away, so you can continue what you are doing and wait for it to come up.”
(P12)
Discussion: While the Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock was considered most secure and was pre-
ferred for sensitive apps and risky scenarios, it annoyed the users. On the other hand, the
less secure configurations were perceived to be more usable and users preferred those for
less sensitive apps and for medium- and low-risk scenarios.
5.3 Overall Perceptions
We find that the participants not only easily adapt to using the modified configurations,
but they respond positively as well to the idea of using our proposed modifications. The
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Figure 5.12: Ranking of the configuration given by the users.
participants liked the idea of getting a fade-in effect during the Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock con-
figuration rather than being abruptly interrupted by an opaque re-authentication prompt.
Also, they utilize the grace period during the fade-in effect to complete their current task.
However, we found no significant difference when users were asked to rank the four configu-
rations in the order of their preference while considering both the security and the usability
of the configurations. Our results suggest that the users generally find it hard to select a
particular configuration as their most preferred configuration (see Figure 5.12) and their
choices are influenced largely by their perceived levels of the sensitivity of the apps they
are using and their perceived security of the surrounding environment.
Location-based preferences: Users demand a high level of protection of the data on their
device in high-risk environments, such as unknown-locations or around strangers/unwanted
individuals. They consider the default configuration (Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock) to be the
most useful in protecting their content in such scenarios. However, their preferences of
the configurations changes considerably while they are using their device in a relaxed
environment, such as around their family members or at home. They dislike using the
default configuration for these cases and prefer using a more convenient configuration where
they can access the content of the app for a while before being asked to re-authenticate.
App-based preferences: Almost all participants in our study were strongly motivated to
use a very secure configuration to protect the information on their banking app. All of them
reported that they were satisfied with the security provided by the default configuration
and prefer using it for the banking app at all times. However, their preferred choices of
the configurations for the email and the photos app varied depending on their individual
perception of the sensitivity of these apps. For the email app, many participants liked
the idea of getting a grace period while composing the emails as it allowed them some
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time to complete writing their thoughts down before finally getting a lock. Most of the
participants did not seem to care about their data on the contacts app. Most of them were
least bothered about using a secure configuration for the contacts app as they felt that the
individual accessing their device will most likely not know any of their contacts.
We present the configuration preferences in terms of the percentage of users willing or
not willing to use a particular configuration for various scenarios in Table 5.1. The table
provides an overview of the participants’ configuration preferences for the email, contacts
and photos app in the bus, office and home scenarios. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, while
all participants preferred Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock for the banking app, for other scenarios
participants had varied choices. For each scenario, we mention the percentages of users
who are willing to use or are not willing to use a particular configuration. During the
study, users who gave a rating of 1 or 2 on a 5-point Likert scale were considered to be
willing to use the configuration while the users who gave a rating of 4 or 5 were considered
not to be willing to use that configuration.
5.3.1 User Perception Regarding IA
At the end of the study, we again asked users if they were willing to use IA as a primary
or a secondary authentication technique on their device. We find that overall, users had
a positive attitude towards IA and were willing to use it (see Figure 5.13). They felt
that IA would be able to provide protection from their family members or close friends
who may already know the passcode of their device. Even some users who did not use
any authentication on their device because they found it time-consuming, preferred being
authenticated implicitly.
“Yes, I would definitely want to use it because it is definitely more secure
than my current scheme which is using passwords. There’s a higher chance for
someone to know my password than be able to imitate my swiping pattern.”
(P4)
“For a person like me, I would like to use IA because I don’t like to lock my
phone because I am very lazy.” (P8)
However, as anticipated because of the frequent authentication interruptions during the
study, a few users were annoyed and raised some concerns regarding using IA. Though we
told the users at the beginning of the study that the interruptions are being simulated,
nevertheless the false rejects slightly impacted their attitude negatively towards IA. They
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Figure 5.13: User preference regarding using IA before and after the study
wanted to use it only for sensitive apps and wanted the accuracy of the system to be im-
proved. Some users even had concerns regarding the correct classification of their behavior
in case of a finger injury or in case their swiping pattern changes after a few weeks or
months.
“I won’t use it because after going through the study, I found it really annoying.
I use emails a lot, so [using IA] would be very annoying.” (P2)
“My speed of swiping could change depending on how tired I am, if I have a
finger injury, so false rejects are possible which is not very convenient.” (P4)
5.3.2 Alternate Re-authentication Techniques
We also asked the participants if there were alternative re-authentication techniques they
would prefer using in addition to locking the device using the above configurations. The
majority of the participants said they would like to get notified of the time and the reason
for re-authentication through an email or an SMS. Some of them insisted on getting detailed
information such as the browsing activity of the user or identifying behavioral characteristic
information which can be used to identify the device user later.
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“Send a notification to the phone and preferably record the time whenever it
gets locked out so at least afterwards whenever I pick up the phone I can try
to guess who might be using it.” (P2)
“It could send an email to the owner as soon as it locks it. If you leave it
[device] in a place and a stranger finds it, it could set up an alternate contact
information, so that if the phone is lost, it can call that number or send an
email to contact.” (P6)
5.4 Summary
Overall, some of the findings from the study correspond to our expectations of these configu-
rations. We find that our hypothesis H1 is correct. As expected, the participants consider
the default configuration, Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock, to be the most annoying configuration.
They do not prefer using the default configuration for less sensitive apps and surround-
ings. However, contrary to our expectations, we do not find a significant reduction in the
task efficiency while the users complete the tasks using the default configuration and our
hypothesis H2 is not supported. The task completion time for all the four configurations
are comparable. We also find that Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock is perceived to be more secure
than Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock, which aligns with H3. The participants respond positively to
the idea of obscuring the content on their device in terms of security. Although the grace
period during Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock does not increase the task efficiency of the users as
we had predicted in H4, users find it really helpful and utilize this period to complete their
tasks.
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Bus Office Home
Would like Would not like Would like Would not like Would like Would not like
to use? to use? to use? to use? to use? to use?
Emails
Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock 27% 53% 27% 40% 47% 26%
Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock 70% 13% 50% 37% 10% 70%
Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock 60% 7% 67% 13% 37% 40%
Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock 37% 33% 50% 23% 63% 13%
No Lock 7% 93% 7% 86% 43% 50%
Contacts
Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock 37% 47% 37% 20% 50% 33%
Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock 40% 47% 23% 64% 7% 80%
Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock 43% 17% 53% 24% 27% 36%
Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock 57% 20% 70% 10% 57% 13%
No Lock 23% 70% 17% 83% 60% 40%
Photos
Imm-Trans-Imm-Lock 33% 50% 23% 60% 44% 33%
Imm-Dark-Imm-Lock 77% 20% 54% 23% 17% 80%
Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock 57% 10% 70% 13% 34% 23%
Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock 23% 33% 37% 23% 57% 16%
No Lock 10% 87% 17% 80% 50% 47%
Table 5.1: Configuration preferences of the participants for different apps and scenarios. Values above 50%
are in bold.
48
Chapter 6
Lock Library
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of FireLock, our Android lock
library, which can be used by developers to re-authenticate users while they are using their
Android app. The library allows the developers to select the lock type out of PIN and pat-
tern locks and the lock configuration out of the four configuration discussed in Section 3.2.
We used Hai Bison’s pattern lock library1 for creating the pattern lock configurations and
used a user interface similar to Android for developing the PIN lock configurations. Below,
we discuss some of the design features provided by FireLock followed by the implemen-
tation of the library. We also provide an evaluation of the GPU performance of the lock
library on a smartphone.
6.1 Design Features
• Flexibility: The lock library can be easily used along with any Android app by
simply adding three lines to the code where the user needs to be re-authenticated.
The developers can also select the type of configuration they want to use for various
applications and scenarios.
• Customizability: The time delay and the screen transparency parameters described
in Section 3.1 can be customized depending on the requirements. For example, for an
email app, the value of the time delay parameter can be increased to leverage more
time to the user in order to allow them to finish writing their thoughts down. On
1https://bitbucket.org/haibison/android-lockpattern
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the other hand, since a banking app contains sensitive data, the screen transparency
could have a small value to hide the data quickly.
• Compatibility: FireLock has been tested on smartphones with different screen
sizes including Nexus 5 and Nexus 6. The configurations are compatible with both
landscape and portrait orientation of the device screen.
• Pass-code Security: The lock library allows secure storage of the pattern and PIN
secrets selected by the users. We provide retention of the secret even after the app
is uninstalled or the cache is cleared by using cloud storage to backup the data and
the user settings.
6.2 Implementation
6.2.1 Requirements
In order to use FireLock, the app developers will be required to download the library from
the Github repository2 and import it as a module in their Android app. The library can
be used in any application running on Android 2.1+ (API level 7+).
6.2.2 First-time Usage
When the users install an app that uses FireLock for the first time, they will be prompted
to select a lock type out of a PIN or a pattern lock for that app. Once they select one
of the lock types, they will be asked to select a pass-code, which they will have to enter
whenever re-authentication is required while they are using that particular app. The lock
type and the pass-code can be later changed by the users using the navigation menu.
6.2.3 Pass-code Persistence
The library securely stores the pass-code (used for re-authentication) to protect it from
being accessed by an adversary. For the pattern lock, we used the in-built encryption
algorithm provided by Hai Bison’s pattern lock library to securely save the user’s choice
of pattern. In order to securely store the PIN, we use PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1, the
2https://github.com/lalitagarwal/FireLock
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native encryption algorithm provided by Android. A randomly generated pass-phrase and
a randomly generated salt is fed into the PBKDF2 algorithm to generate the encryption
key. The salt along with the pass-phrase are securely stored in an internal storage using
SharedPreferences3. SharedPreferences securely stores the passcode and the user settings
of any app in the form of a key-value pair and prevents other apps from accessing this data.
However, the SharedPreferences data is lost once the app is uninstalled or the app-specific
cache is cleared. In order to address this issue, we use BackupAgent4 to store a copy of
the app data to a remote cloud storage. This allows the restoration of the pass-code and
the user settings in case the user re-installs the app or performs a factory reset. Therefore,
an adversary will not be able to access the content of a locked app by re-installing it or by
clearing the cache.
6.2.4 Re-authenticating Users
The lock library contains the PinLock and the PatternLock activity that contain the
appropriate visual components using which the users can enter their pass-code. While the
PinLock activity provides a numeric keypad to enter the 4-digit PIN, the PatternLock
activity displays a 3-by-3 grid for entering the pattern. To activate one of the re-authenti-
cation configurations, the app developers need to use Intents5 to call the PinLock or the
PatternLock activity from the appropriate location in the code. For example, if a user
needs to be re-authenticated every time they send a text message to a specific person, the
following code can be inserted inside the onClickListener6 method of the send button:
1 Intent pinLock= new Intent(this, PinLock.class);
2 pinLock.putExtra("category", <category>);
3 pinLock.putExtra("scrTransp", <seconds>); //Optional
4 pinLock.putExtra("timeDelay", <seconds>); //Optional
5 startActivity(pinLock);
The app developer needs to specify the lock configuration out of the four configurations
mentioned in Section 3.2. Lines 3 and 4 are optional and can be used to change the default
3https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/SharedPreferences.html
4https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/backup/BackupAgent.html
5https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent.html
6https://developer.android.com/reference/android/view/View.OnClickListener.html
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values of the time delay and the screen transparency parameters. While the default value
for the scrTransp variable is ten seconds, the default value for the timeDelay variable
is four seconds. Therefore, by simply including three lines of code in their app, developers
can ask users to re-authenticate themselves.
6.3 Evaluation
We analyzed the performance of FireLock in terms of the resources being used. We mea-
sured the battery consumption using Android’s Battery Historian tool7 and found the
library to be consuming less than 2% of the battery for a continuous one-hour usage.
We also analyzed the GPU resources being used by FireLock by measuring the number
of frames rendered by each configuration. We activate each configuration ten times on
a Nexus 5 device and use Android’s GPU profiling tool8 to record the number of frames
rendered by the configuration during each activation. As shown in Figure 6.1, we find
that among the four configurations, the maximum number of frames are rendered by the
Grad-Dark-Grad-Lock and by the Grad-Dark-Imm-Lock configuration. Not surprisingly,
the other two configurations, which did not use any animation feature rendered the least
number of frames. We also observed the frames rendered by Android’s Webview display-
ing a single Wikipedia page and a Webview displaying popular websites which included
Facebook, Twitter, New York Times and IMDB and found it to be much higher than the
frames rendered by each of the four configurations.
6.3.1 Use Case
We provide an implementation of FireLock for a behavior-based authentication scheme
and test it on a messaging app. We use our library along with Itus9, which is an Android
library authenticating users using touch-based and keystroke-based classifiers. We integrate
both FireLock and Itus with an open-source messaging application called Signal10. We
provide separate implementations of touch-based and keystroke-based authentication in
our Github repository11. The demo re-authenticates the users based on the classification
7https://developer.android.com/studio/profile/battery-historian.html
8https://developer.android.com/training/testing/performance.html
9https://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/itus/
10https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android
11https://github.com/lalitagarwal/FireLock/tree/master/demo
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Figure 6.1: The number of frames rendered by the GPU for each of the four configura-
tions and a Webview displaying a Wikipedia page. (Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals)
score as provided by Itus. In case of a low score, the re-authentication prompt is activated
whenever the user presses the send button to send a text message. The user is unable to
send the message unless they re-authenticate themselves by entering the correct pass-code.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed two modifications to the default authentication prompts of two primary au-
thentication schemes (PIN and pass-lock) to make them more suitable for re-authentication
scenarios: a transparent authentication prompt and a time delay before the authentication
prompt appears. In terms of task performance, the proposed configurations perform as
well as the default configuration. However, the proposed configurations were perceived
to be more convenient and less annoying by the users. We observe that user preferences
of the configurations are largely context-based and there is no particular configuration
that users want to use at all times. In terms of preference, while users want to use the
default configuration (which obscures the app content) for highly sensitive applications,
their choices for medium and less sensitive apps are influenced by their perception of the
security of the surrounding environment and users preferred the proposed configurations
for most of the less risky scenarios. We provide implementation details of our lock library,
FireLock, and a real-world usage scenario for a behavior-based authentication scheme. The
lock library provides a convenient way for developers to allow re-authentication in their
apps by adding only three lines in their code. We believe that our findings will help in
the design of re-authentication schemes that satisfy users’ competing security and usability
requirements.
The feedback from the user study gave us insights into the preferences of the partici-
pants, which will help in improving the design of the configurations and the implementation
of the lock library. We present some of the suggestions given by the participants in the
sections below.
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7.1 Design
While the majority of users responded positively to the modified re-authentication prompt
configurations, six participants found the fade-in effect to be annoying and recommended
alternate ways to notify them before locking them out. During the interviews, these par-
ticipants indicated that the cause of this annoyance was the wait for the authentication
prompt to appear:
“I would rather deal with the lock as quickly as I can so I can get back to using
the phone.” (P9)
One participant suggested that the source of annoyance was its resemblance to the inter-
ruption on the web for subscription-based content:
“I don’t like it at all because it reminded of those websites, where you are
scrolling and it stops letting you read the content and that kind of is obstructed
and annoying.” (P7)
We sought suggestions from the participants during the semi-structured interview on how
the re-authentication should be performed or improved. They proposed displaying a small
timer at the top of the screen to indicate the time left before the users would be re-
authenticated. Their comments were:
“Maybe it can prompt you to type out a pattern on your phone without the
visual obstruction, maybe like a small notification. It will warn you that it is
going to lock and you can dismiss it by providing the secret.” (P9)
“Maybe instead of gradual fading, you can have a small timer up there on the
screen near the status bar so that I should be expecting to get a lock screen.”
(P15)
Similar to the findings of previous research efforts on primary authentication schemes
[EJP+14, HRS+12], our findings indicate that future experiments on user re-authentication
should leverage app sensitivity and location information to ease the re-authentication bur-
den. Whereas most participants of our study had similar security preferences in terms of
the three scenarios (bus, office, home) evaluated in this study, there was a disagreement
regarding the security preferences for the four apps. Therefore, re-authentication schemes
need to provide users with a control to define these security preferences. A comment by a
participant demonstrates the need for this:
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“You can have three different levels of security [depending on security pref-
erences] and group your apps into those levels depending on the security you
want for each app.” (P9)
7.2 Implementation
During the user study, we received some comments regarding the design and display of
the re-authentication prompt suggesting that the delay before the appearance of the re-
authentication prompt and the color of the screen during the fade-in effect should be
customizable. Our current implementation only allows the app developers to change the
values of the time delay and the screen transparency parameters. Future work in this area
can focus on allowing even users to select their preferred configuration and change the
parameter values according to their needs through the app menu.
Use Cases
We provided a demo of the lock library for a behavior-based authentication scheme. De-
ploying the lock library along with contextual-based authentication schemes, which au-
thenticate users based on their location or based on their proximity to Bluetooth or WiFi
devices can be an interesting work for the future.
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Appendix A
Pre-Study Survey
Before the study, participants were asked about their security preferences. In addition, we
collected demographic information from the participants including their name, age group,
gender, highest level of education and their current occupation.
A.1 Device Lock Usage
1. Do you currently use a lock mechanism for your device (smartphone/tablet)?
(a) Yes; (b) No
2. If they use a lock mechanism: Which lock mechanism do you use to lock your
device?
(a) PIN Lock (4 digit or more); (b) Password Lock (characters and numbers); (c)
Pattern Lock; (d) Fingerprint Recognition; (e) Face Recognition
3. If they use a lock mechanism: Who all do you want to protect your smartphone
access from? (Select all that applies)
(a) Coworker; (b) Friends; (c) Spouse; (d) Own Children; (e) Room-mate; (f) Other
unwanted individual/stranger
4. If they do not use a lock mechanism: Why do you not use any authentication
on your phone? (Select all that applies)
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(a) It takes time to unlock the phone; (b) I don’t have any data on my phone which
needs to be protected; (c) No one would care about what’s on my phone; (d) In an
emergency, others can use my phone; (e) I have never thought about it
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Appendix B
Study Questionnaire
B.1 User Perception of Individual Configurations
After the participants completed both the text entry and the email activity using one of
the four configurations, we asked them to give a feedback on their experience with the
evaluated configuration using the following questionnaire.
• Evaluate each of the following configurations that you will observe while doing the
experiment. For each category, rate each configuration on a 5-point-Likert scale.
1. Immediate Dark Immediate Lock: Screen turns dark right away and PIN/Pattern
appears
2. Immediate Transparent, Immediate Lock: Screen turns and stays transparent and
PIN/Pattern appears right away
3. Gradual Dark, Immediate Lock: Screen slowly turns dark and PIN/Pattern appears
right away
4. Gradual Dark, Gradual Lock: Screen slowly turns dark and PIN/Pattern appears
after a while
(For each configuration, the participants had to give a rating to the following
questions on a 5-point Likert-type scale.)
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1. Assume someone picks up your smartphone and starts reading your emails. How
secure do you find the configuration to protect your data in this scenario?
(5- Very Secure, 1- Very Insecure)
2. How easy was it to use the configuration?
(5- Very Easy, 1- Very Difficult)
3. How obstructive was the configuration?
(5- Not Obstructive at all, 1- Very Obstructive)
4. How annoying was the configuration?
(5- Not Annoying at all, 1- Very Annoying)
(Once the participant evaluated and rated all four configurations, we asked
them to rank them in the order of their preference.)
• Rank the configurations in the order of your preference. Please take both the config-
uration’s security and its usability into account.
(1- Most Preferred configuration, 4- Least Preferred configuration)
B.2 Context-based Feedback of the Configurations
B.2.1 Sensitivity Ratings
Please provide a sensitivity rating of the following apps given how you use your mobile
device and how sensitive you think each app is:
1. Email App
2. Contacts App
3. Photos App
4. Banking App
(5- Very sensitive, 1- Not very sensitive)
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B.2.2 Scenarios
Now imagine the following scenarios and select which lock configuration you would prefer
in each case. The lock configurations will get activated in case the system notices any
suspicious activity. Please remember that since the system does not have 100% accuracy, it
may assume you to be an adversary and you could encounter one of the lock configurations
while you are using the device yourself. Assume that all of the apps below are protected
only with implicit authentication and no other protection mechanism.
Bus Scenario
Imagine you are riding a bus and you accidentally leave your smartphone on the bus.
A stranger picks up the device and starts using it, which gets detected by the implicit
authentication protection mechanism. The stranger may launch different apps on your
smartphone. For each app, the implicit protection mechanism could take a different action
when detecting misuse. For each of the apps listed below, rank the order of preference of
the lock configuration you would prefer with 1 being your most preferred lock configuration
and 5 being your least preferred lock configuration.
Please remember that even you could encounter these configurations while you are using
your phone on the bus.
(For each of the above scenarios the participants had to rank the configura-
tions according to their order of preference for the following apps)
1. Views the emails in your inbox
2. Looks at the contacts on your smartphone
3. Views the photos stored on your smartphone
4. Accesses the banking app on your smartphone
Office Scenario
Imagine you are in your office and your boss urgently calls you for a meeting. You leave
your phone on your desk and one of your office colleagues starts using your phone, which
gets detected by the implicit authentication protection mechanism. Your colleague may
launch different apps on your smartphone. For each app, the implicit protection mechanism
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could take a different action when detecting misuse. For each of the apps listed below, rank
the order of preference of the lock configuration you would prefer with 1 being your most
preferred configuration and 5 being your least preferred configuration.
Please remember that even you could encounter these configurations while you are using
your phone in your office.
Home Scenario
Imagine you are watching television at home with your partner and you unknowingly doze
off to sleep. Your partner realises that you are asleep and starts using your smartphone,
which gets detected by the implicit authentication protection mechanism. Your partner
may launch different apps on your smartphone. For each app, the implicit protection
mechanism could take a different action when detecting misuse. For each of the apps listed
below, rank the order of preference of the lock configuration you would prefer with 1 being
your most preferred configuration and 5 being your least preferred configuration.
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Appendix C
Semi-Structured Interview
We asked the following questions to the participants during the semi-structured interviews:
1. What was your overall impression of the configurations we showed to you? Did you
find the configurations to be annoying?
2. Would you change anything about these configurations to improve their usability or
security?
3. Did you like a particular configuration more than the other?
4. Did you dislike a particular configuration more than the other?
5. Will you be willing to use any configuration on your device for daily usage? Why?
Why not?
6. Are there any particular scenarios where you think that these configurations will be
useful to you?
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